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Abstract
Federal, state and local wetlands protection laws that restrict landowners’ ability to
develop their properties in certain ways could decrease the value of the affected properties. 
However, the regulations could also give benefits to nearby neighbors who no longer need worry
about increased development in their area.  Given that some properties may decline in value,
while others increase, the impact on individual properties must be determined empirically. 
This study uses a data set from Newton, Massachusetts to examine the impact of wetlands
laws on the regulated properties, as well as on proximate properties.  Looking at house sales data
from 1988 through 2005, the hedonic technique is used to estimate the effect of wetlands
regulations on single family home prices and finds that having wetlands on a property decreases
its value by 4% relative to non-regulated properties.  Homes that are contiguous to regulated
houses do not experience any change in price.  Thus it seems unlikely that neighbors are
receiving any benefit from knowing that further development is restricted in their immediate
vicinity.  
JEL Classification Codes: Q51, Q53, R2
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Introduction: 
 
 Environmental regulations are put in place to protect human health as well as the 
health of various other species.  These regulations can impose costs on various 
individuals and groups, but the laws are expected to give benefits as well.  It is possible 
that those individuals who bear the costs are not the same as those who receive the 
benefits.  In particular, federal, state and local wetlands protection laws that can restrict 
landowners’ ability to develop their properties in certain ways could decrease the value of 
the affected properties.  However, the regulations could also give benefits to nearby 
neighbors who no longer need worry about increased development in their area.  In 
addition, the decreased supply of developable land should increase prices if demand 
remains strong in the area.  Given that some properties may decline in value, while others 
increase, the impact on individual properties must be determined empirically. 
 There is little empirical evidence about the impact of wetlands regulations on 
residential properties.  Guttery, Poe and Sirmans (2000) look at the impact of regulations 
in Louisiana on multifamily housing units, and find that properties that are regulated 
experience a decline in value of 10.5% relative to non-regulated properties.  Other studies 
(cited below) look at the impact of proximity of wetlands on house values, and obtain 
mixed results.  Netusil (2005) studies properties that are directly impacted, and finds no 
statistical effect; however her sample size is very small.   
 This leaves open the question of what is the impact of wetlands regulations on a 
single family residence, as well as what is the impact on nearby non-regulated houses.  It 
is important to consider both questions, since wetlands regulations impact some 
properties in a town, but not others.  In this way the regulations differ from other types of 
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land use controls such as large lot zoning which are generally consistent throughout the 
town. 
 This study uses a data set from Newton, Massachusetts to address these two 
questions.  Looking at house sales data from 1988 through 2005, the hedonic technique is 
used to estimate the effect of wetlands regulations on single family home prices and finds 
that having wetlands on a property decreases its value by 4% relative to non-regulated 
properties.  Homes that are contiguous to regulated houses do not experience any change 
in price.  Thus it seems unlikely that neighbors are receiving any benefit from knowing 
that further development is restricted in their immediate vicinity.   
It is important to remember that when using the hedonic method to estimate the 
costs and benefits, we can only measure the private impacts on local homeowners.  Our 
estimates will not include any costs or benefits born by anyone, or anything, else.  Thus 
any public benefits or benefits to the ecosystem are not calculated here (see Brander, 
Florax and Vermaat (2006) for a survey of studies that value other aspects of wetlands). 
 This paper begins with a brief discussion of wetlands regulation in the United 
States, and then presents a review of the wetlands literature.  The hedonic model is 
developed, and the data used to estimate the model are discussed.  The estimation results 
follow. 
 
Background: 
 The federal government regulates wetlands in the U.S. in an effort to preserve 
them as much as possible.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), under the Clean Water Act (CWA), enforce these 
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regulations.  The CWA requires that landowners receive permission from the Corps 
before conducting dredging or filling activities on any land defined as a “wetland” or 
other waters of the U.S.  States and localities can have stricter requirements on 
landowners in this aspect, and many do.  Prior to issuing a building permit, landowners 
can be required to undergo an environmental review outlining the impact on the local 
area and its habitats if the wetlands were to be altered.  Under wetlands regulations, it is 
more than human health and well-being that is considered; the ecosystem, including fish 
and wildlife, also must be considered (Guttery, Poe and Sirmans (2000)).  The current 
regulations have been successful in slowing the draining of wetlands.   
According to a report issued by the National Wetland Inventory (Status and 
Trends of Wetlands in the Coterminous United States 1986 to 1977, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service), the rate of wetland loss in the United States has decreased to an 
estimated annual loss of 58,500 acres (an 80 percent reduction compared to the 
previous decade).  The Natural Resource Conservation Service’s Natural 
Resource Inventory (NRI), reporting on the health of America’s private lands, 
also shows significant reduction in wetland losses.  The NRI found an average 
annual net loss of 32,600 acres of wetlands on nonfederal lands from 1992 to 
1997 (a 58 percent reduction compared to the previous decade) (U.S. EPA 2000 
National Water Quality Inventory).   
 
 As discussed in Kiel (2005), it is expected that land that has been regulated in this 
way should decrease in value, all else held constant, since its use is now restricted.  If the 
owner wants to develop the property, either to build on it or to expand the existing 
structures, then they must go through the permitting process.  This process on average 
takes 788 days (Sunding and Zilberman (2002)).  Anyone who is considering purchasing 
the property will take this additional time, and the possibility that the use will be denied, 
into consideration and will incorporate these costs into the price they are willing to pay.   
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(Netusil (2006) refers to this as the ‘development effect’).  The empirical question is how 
much will the price of the property fall? 
 When considering the costs and benefits of wetlands regulations, the costs and 
benefits to the rest of society must be added to those felt by the individual who is directly 
impacted by the laws.  In the case of wetlands regulations, it is therefore important to 
estimate the costs or benefits to the owners of the neighboring properties.  If having 
regulated property contiguous to your property is perceived as a benefit, in that the 
property will not be developed or that the wetlands will not be disturbed, then the 
unregulated properties should increase in value (Netusil refers to this as the ‘amenity 
effect’).  In addition, if having regulated property in your neighborhood decreases the 
supply of developable land, then the non-regulated properties should increase in value 
(Beaton (1991)).  The extent of the increase in value is an empirical question, and one 
that needs to be answered in order to calculate fully the private costs and benefits to an 
area that has regulated properties. 
 This study can only estimate the private costs and benefits of wetlands regulations 
as incurred by local homeowners.  Any social benefits, such as increased water quality, 
flood control, or ground-water recharge cannot be captured by this study.  Additionally, 
nonuse values cannot be estimated, although those values may be quite large (Stevens et 
al. 1995).  This study can, however, look both at the impact on individuals whose 
properties are regulated and at those who are not directly impacted by the regulation, but 
who can benefit from it simply by being close to someone whose property is restricted. 
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Literature Review: 
 Surprisingly, given the extent of wetlands regulations in the U.S., there are only a 
few studies of the impact of the restrictions on residential properties.   Other types of 
restrictions such as coastal area building restrictions have been studied (e.g. Frech and 
Lafferty (1984) and Parsons and Wu (1991)).  The impact of wetlands on multifamily 
housing units was examined by Guttery, Poe and Sirmans (2000) who found that the sales 
prices of the units affected by the wetlands regulations fell by 10.5% relative to 
unregulated properties, a signal of the development effect.  Their study is one of only two 
to control for wetlands on the property site itself.  However they do not test for the 
amenity effect. 
To study the effect of wetlands regulations on single family homes, Lupi, 
Graham-Tomasi and Taff (1991) used residential sales data from 1987 through 1989 in 
Ramsey County, Minnesota.  Using the hedonic method described below, the authors 
included information on the house’s structural characteristics, whether or not the house 
was next to a lake, the total lake acreage in the property’s survey section, and the total 
wetland acreage in the property’s survey section.  The wetland data includes only 
wetlands over 2.5 acres, so not all will be included.  In addition, the wetlands are only 
identified at the survey section level, but since more precise data were not available the 
authors felt it was the best alternative.  Wetland acres per section were found to have a 
statistically significant and positive effect on property values, suggesting that having 
wetlands near the property yields positive benefits.  They also report that the impact is 
larger in areas with lower wetland acreage.  However, their study does not control for 
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whether the property itself had wetlands on it, so we cannot determine if there was any 
development impact on the regulated property.   
 In another study of Ramsey County, Doss and Taff (1996) test whether distance to 
a wetland, and the type of wetland, impact house prices.  In a regression where the 
house’s assessed value is the dependent variable, independent variables include lot size, 
number of bathrooms, living area, age of the house, distance to the nearest lake and 
distance (and distance squared) to the nearest wetland, of which there are four different 
types.  They are able to include distance because they employ the National Wetlands 
Inventory data base.  The minimum distance is one meter, which is likely to be on the 
property itself, but their variable does not allow the impact to differ if it is on the property 
versus on a neighboring property.  The authors find that home owners in Ramsey County 
prefer scrub-shrub wetlands, followed by open-water wetlands, and then forested 
wetlands.  Again, the study does not control for the existence of wetlands on the property 
itself, but amenity benefits appear to exist.  If there is a development impact, their 
measure of benefits may be incorrectly estimated. 
 Mahan, Polasky, and Adams (2000) estimated the value of wetland amenities in 
Portland, Oregon using sales data from June 1992 through May 1994.  Included in their 
explanatory variables are the log of the distance to the nearest wetland, the size of the 
nearest wetland, and indicators for the type of the nearest wetland.  The authors divide 
the Portland market into five areas since “[M]any residents perceive the segments as 
being distinctly different in character” (page 105-06).  The econometric impact of this 
segmentation on the estimation of a single hedonic regression is not discussed further 
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(see assumptions discussed below).1  The wetlands variable is created using the National 
Wetlands Inventory, so again we cannot separate the wetlands that are on the property 
from those that on neighboring properties.  The estimated coefficient on the log of 
distance is negative and statistically significant; increasing the distance to the nearest 
wetlands decreases the value of the house, all else held constant.  Increasing the size of 
the nearest wetland increases the value of the house.  Thus wetlands are seen as a positive 
amenity.  Again, the authors do not control for the existence of wetlands on the property 
itself so the value may be combining both the development and amenity impacts. 
 Using a similar, but smaller, data set, Bin (2005) uses a semiparametric method to 
estimate a hedonic regression.  He reports that being closer to an open water wetland 
increases property values, while being closer to an emergent vegetation wetland 
decreases property value.  Thus he claims that whether or not wetlands are a positive or 
negative amenity depends on the type of wetland.  Bin also includes indicators for five 
different sections of Portland and does not control for existence of a wetland on the 
property itself. 
 In a third study of Portland, Netusil (2005) includes environmental characteristics 
of the property itself (including wetlands, streams and tree canopy) along with 
characteristics of the surrounding area.   She also controls for the two types of 
environmental zoning that Portland has created: the protection zone and the conservation 
zone, as well as other types of zoning.  The five quadrants of Portland, as used by other 
researchers, are included, as are various interaction terms.   The coefficient on having a 
wetland on the property is not statistically significant, so the existence of a wetland does 
                                                 
1 In a later section of the paper, the authors estimate five separate hedonic equations, the results of which 
are used to estimate demand curves for wetlands size.  However, since the authors were “unable to obtain 
meaningful second-stage results…. It is unclear whether separate markets truly exist…” (page 112).   
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not impact the sales price.  However, since the environmental zoning for the property is 
also controlled for, and being affected by zoning is “a consequence of an amenity located 
on the property” (page 237), the zoning and wetlands measures are likely highly 
correlated and thus statistical insignificance of one is not unexpected.  In addition, there 
are only 10 properties in the sample that have wetlands on them.   
Netusil also finds that having a wetland within 200 feet of the property, and 
having a wetland within 200 feet to ¼ mile of the property, does not affect the property 
value, but again the number of affected properties is very small.  Only when a wetland is 
¼ to ½ of a mile from the property is price impacted, and it is lowered.  Thus having a 
wetland farther away from the house is a negative externality.  The author does not 
discuss whether theory would predict these results, or why her results are different from 
those of Mahan et al.   
Glaeser and Ward (2006) look at house sales data from 2000-2005 in eastern 
Massachusetts.  Their regression includes house characteristics such as number of rooms 
and lot size, town characteristics such as distance to Boston and average acres per lot, and 
year fixed effects.  They also include an index of regulations that is the sum of three 
dummy variables, each of which takes on a value of one if the town has a rule that 
exceeds the states standard for wetlands, septic systems and subdivisions.  The estimated 
coefficient on their index variable ranges from 0.071 to 0.101 and is statistically 
significant, thus the inclusion of such a regulation increases the price of a house by seven 
to ten percent.  This approach assumes that the impact of each of the three types of 
regressions is the same; however wetlands regulations will impact only some of the 
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homes in the town where as septic rules are the same for all homes.    Their results do not 
allow us to consider the development or amenity effect of wetlands regulations. 
Although they do not study house prices directly, there are two papers that 
examine the impact of wetlands regulations, as well as other types of land use controls, 
on residential development.  The first, by Glaeser, Schuetz, and Ward (2006), examines 
187 communities in eastern Massachusetts from 1980 through 2002.  They test whether 
having stricter wetlands regulations than the state requires impacts the number of total 
housing permits issued by the town, controlling for septic regulations, subdivision 
regulations, and city and year fixed effects.  The estimated coefficients on wetlands are 
not statistically significant.   
The second study, by Sims and Schuetz (2007) uses the same data set to study the 
impact of land use regulations on the conversion of land to residential use.  They find that 
wetlands regulations slow the conversion of forest and agricultural land to residential use 
by only 1.1 – 1.4% over the 1985-1999 period.  They cannot, given their data set, 
examine the impact of the regulations on particular parcels, but rather the aggregate 
impact of regulations on development in each town. 
 
Model: 
 In order to estimate the impact of a wetlands designation on a single-family home 
and on the neighboring homes, the hedonic house price method is used2.  Hedonics is a 
revealed preference approach that uses house values to measure the value of an 
                                                 
2 Although the difference-in-difference approach would be preferred, this would require housing sales data 
prior to 1972 when the Federal wetlands regulations were enacted.  Data from the late 1960s has not been 
found for a town where properties that contain wetlands could be identified, thus the hedonic approach is 
used. 
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environmental good.  The concept is based on an idea from Griliches (1971) and Rosen 
(1974) that many characteristics affecting the quality of life are considered when buying 
a house, and that consumers’ preferences regarding the characteristics will be represented 
in the price that they are willing to pay for the house.  Such characteristics include the 
number of bedrooms, lot size, local school quality, and local environmental quality.  
Hedonic regressions can be used to measure the consumer’s willingness to pay for a 
house with a certain level of environmental quality, holding all other characteristics of the 
house constant.  Thus the measurement of the price of a non-marketed good can be 
obtained. 
 Following Rosen (see Freeman (2003) for an excellent discussion), the hedonic 
model is based on individuals who, when demanding a house, maximize their utility and 
suppliers of housing who maximize their profits.  When a house is offered for sale and is 
purchased, we assume that both the buyer and the seller are satisfied with the outcome.  
Thus the hedonic function depends on the interaction of the demand and supply sides of 
the housing market.   
 The hedonic method requires that the housing market be in equilibrium, that the 
characteristics of the house are known by both the buyer and the seller, that there is no 
discrimination in the market, and that the market is a single market.  If any of these 
assumptions are not correct, then the reported sales price of the house may not fully 
reflect the house’s characteristics (see Kiel (2006) for a more complete discussion of 
these assumptions).   
 In order to determine the impact of wetlands designation on house prices, an 
indicator of the designation will be included in the regression.  The impact of having a 
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neighboring property designated will be measured by including information on the 
number of contiguous properties that are designated as wetlands.  Thus the hedonic 
equation to be estimated is: 
εβββ
βββ
+++
+++=
)Re(#)()(Pr
)()()(Pr
543
210
sWetWetlandiceIndex
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where HouseCharacteristics includes items such as number of bedrooms, 
NeighborhoodCharacteristics includes local controls, PriceIndex controls for changes in 
the prices of housing due to market changes, Wetland indicates whether the property 
itself has designated wetlands on it, and #ResWet is the number of contiguous properties 
that are residential and have designated wetlands on them.   
 Theory suggests that β4 will be negative; because the property is restricted in how 
it can be developed, it will have a lower price, all else held constant.  This is the 
development effect.  The coefficient on the neighboring residential properties (β5) is 
likely to be positive; because your neighbors are restricted in how they can develop their 
property, you know that the property next to you will stay as it is into the future and 
wetlands are seen as a positive externality.  This is the amenity effect. 
  
Data: 
 This study examines the impacts of wetlands regulations on single family houses 
and the neighboring units in Newton, Massachusetts (see Figure 1).  Newton was chosen 
because it is a well-established residential suburb of Boston that is fairly densely 
populated (4,643.6 people per square mile (2000 Census)).  It has seen a slight increase in 
population between 1990 and 2000 (1.5%) relative to growth in the state (5.5%), and has 
a homeownership rate of 69.5% (2000).  Housing is expensive in Newton with a median 
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value of owner-occupied units of $438,400 (2000) and a lower poverty rate (4.3%) than 
the rest of the state (9.3%).   The Newton public school system is considered one of the 
top in the state and sends nearly 88% of its students on to higher education (Newton city 
website).   
 According to the City of Newton website, Newton covers over 18 square miles, 
and 19.6% of the area is open space of which 55% is publicly owned.   The city has 14 
lakes and ponds, and 22 streams and brooks, and is bordered by the Charles River.  It has 
268 acres of wetlands, which is 2.3% of the city’s total area (City of Newton, 
Massachusetts Recreation and Open Space Plan Update 2003-2007, 2003).  The wetlands 
are scattered across the city, and are located in areas where the average income is 
relatively high and in areas where it is relatively low (see Figure 2).  Newton’s wetlands 
include deep marsh, open water, shallow marsh meadows, and shrub and wooded 
swamps.   
The federal regulations on wetlands were discussed above; state and local 
governments can enact laws that are more strict than the federal laws if they so choose.  
Massachusetts law (Chapter 131, Section 40 of the Massachusetts General Laws) passed 
in 1972 states that any wetland, which includes any freshwater wetland, any estuary, 
creek, river, stream, pond, lake, or certified vernal pool; land under any of the water 
bodies listed, land subject to flooding; and any riverfront areas in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, plus a 100-foot buffer zone around any fresh water or coastal resource 
listed above is subject to jurisdiction (Massachusetts Office of Coastal Management web 
site).   Any development of the regulated areas requires the owner to notify the city or 
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town as well as the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection in order to 
obtain their permission to proceed. 
Newton adopted its own wetlands protection laws in 1985.  These laws are stricter 
than the state laws in that the areas that are covered under the definition “areas subject to 
inundation and flooding” are larger.  The state regulations require boundaries based on a 
100-year flood line as determined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
Newton however supplements the FEMA maps with local data (Dain, 2005).   
 Data on the sales of single family homes in Newton from January 1988 through 
June 2005 were purchased from The Warren Group, a private vendor.  The original data 
set contained 12,656 observations.  After deleting observations that were in the top or 
bottom four percent of the house price distribution3, those recorded as having no 
bedrooms or bathrooms, those with recorded ages less than zero, as well as duplexes, 
townhouses and two family properties,  11,341 observations were left (see Table 1 for 
variable descriptions and descriptive statistics). 
Properties that were located on designated wetlands were identified by the City of 
Newton’s Planning Department.  This information was used to create a variable called 
‘Wetland’ which is equal to one if the property has been designated as containing 
wetlands and 0 if it is not.  In order to identify wetlands that are neighboring the 
properties that sold, another variable is created:  ‘Rnwet’ that measures the number of 
residential neighboring properties with wetlands.  Properties identified as residential 
include those with houses, apartments, and condominiums, as well as those with the land 
                                                 
3 This removed observations that might have been outliers such as not being at arm’s length or being 
miscoded. 
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use types “undevelopable” or “potentially developable” that are completely surrounded 
by residential properties.   
In order to assign a value to the “Rnwet” variable to a property that was identified 
as having wetlands, the property was first located on the Newton Assessor’s website 
(http://www.ci.newton.ma.us/assessors2003/Search.asp).  Using the map on this website, 
the addresses of all contiguous properties to the property in question were recorded.  The 
data were searched for all of the contiguous properties in the list of the properties in 
Newton with wetlands.  For any of the contiguous properties in the list, they were 
identified as being residential, the number of each type was added up, and recorded the 
appropriate number in the “Rnwet” column of the sales data spreadsheet.  This process 
was repeated for all 308 properties in the original sales data set that contain wetlands. 
The map of the Newton sales data, as well as the list of all properties in Newton 
with wetlands, was then used to identify properties with wetlands that were not in the 
sales data set but may have been a neighbor to a property that was in the sales data set.  
To do this, a wetland was first located on the GIS map and all of the streets nearby that 
may have been affected by the wetland were identified.   The list of all wetlands 
properties was searched for these streets and all of the addresses of the properties with 
wetlands on each street were recorded.  If these properties were not part of the sales data 
set, each one was located on the Newton Assessor’s website and the addresses of all 
contiguous properties were recorded.  If any of these contiguous properties were in the 
sales data set, a “1” was added to the “Rnwet” column of these properties.  For these 
properties that were in the sales data set, all contiguous properties were checked and any 
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additional neighbors with wetlands that were not part of the sales data set were identified.  
This process was repeated for all wetlands properties in Newton, as identified by the City.   
 There are 256 properties with designated wetlands in our final sample (see the 
means and standard deviations in Table 1).  These properties are more expensive, 
younger and have more bedrooms and bathrooms than does the entire sample.  Of those 
properties that have wetlands, 99 do not have any residential neighbors that are similarly 
designated, and 97 have only one such neighbor (Figure 3).  A total of 349 properties that 
do not have designated wetlands on them have neighbors with wetlands.   
 In order to control for changes in the Newton housing market over time, a deflator 
was used.  The model was estimated with the Consumer Price Index for all urban 
consumers in the Northeast, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The model 
was also estimated using a series of indicator variables for the year in which the house 
was sold.  The results are similar, so only those using the latter approach are reported. 
  
Results: 
 The regression results can be found in Table 2 and Table 3.  In Table 2 whether or 
not the house has designated wetlands on its property is controlled for.  The age and age 
squared of the house have atypical signs and suggest that houses in Newton increase in 
value as they get older, but at a decreasing rate.  The number of bedrooms and bathrooms 
and the size of the lot on which the house is located all increase the value of the house, as 
expected.  Included in the regression are indicator variables of the style of the house 
itself.  The categories are cape cod, colonial, contemporary, old style, ranch, split level, 
Tudor and Victorian, with the omitted category being cottage.  These styles are defined 
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by the Newton city appraiser’s office.  All styles increase the price of a house, relative to 
the cottage style, and all are statistically significant.   
 The neighborhood characteristics are controlled for by village indicator variables.  
Newton is divided into 14 villages, each with its own small ‘center.’ However, there are 
no official village boundaries, so zip codes were chosen to represent the villages.  There 
are 10 zip codes in Newton and the school district lines (for 15 elementary schools) are 
similar to the village lines so that this variable also indicates what grade school the 
residents can attend.  The excluded zip code is 02468 (Waban).  The coefficients on the 
remaining zip codes are all negative and statistically significant at the 10% level except 
for the 02467 (Chestnut Hill) zip code; thus each zip code has lower prices than Waban 
all else constant. 
 The included variables explain almost 70% of the variation in the dependent 
variable.  The coefficient on Wetland is -0.035 and it is statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  This suggests that having the property contain designated wetlands does matter in 
Newton in this time period and that it decreases the sales price by 3.5%.  This result 
differs from that reported by Netusil who found that wetlands on the property had no 
statistical impact on the value of the property and it contradicts the results reported by 
Mahan et al and Bin who found that wetlands were a positive amenity, although they 
were looking at the proximity of wetlands, not the existence of them on the property 
itself.  The result here is similar in sign, although not magnitude, to that found by 
Guttery, Poe and Sirmans who reported a 10.5% decrease in price for multifamily homes 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.     
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 Table 3 presents the results when Wetlands and RNWET (the number of 
contiguous neighboring properties that are also designated as wetlands) are both included.  
The coefficient on Wetland is now -0.04 and it is statistically significant at the 7% level.  
Thus it appears that in Newton having your property designated as a wetland (after 
controlling for neighboring properties’ designation) decreases the value of the property 
by 4 % all else held constant.  The coefficient on Rnwet is 0.006 but is not statistically 
different from zero.  The results found here contradict the findings of Mahan et al and 
Bin; wetlands near your property are not seen as a positive amenity.  However, having 
them on your property is a negative externality.    
 It is possible that including Rnwet as a numerical variable is not appropriate.  The 
model was therefore estimated including five indicator variables (Neigh0, …. Neigh5).  
Neighx takes on a value of one if the number of contiguous properties with wetlands is x, 
and is equal to zero otherwise.  The results show that Wetland remains statistically 
significant and has an estimated coefficient of -0.04.  Neigh1 through Neigh4 are not 
statistically significant, but Neigh5 is positive and is significant.  However, only 11 
observations have 5 contiguous properties and so concerns about small sample size arise.   
 These results indicate that there is a development effect but not an amenity effect 
of wetlands in Newton.   Thus there are costs to the property owner of having wetlands 
on the property itself, and those costs may not be balanced by the benefits of having 
neighbors with wetlands.   
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Conclusions: 
 This study looks at the impact of wetlands designation on residential property 
values.   In theory, the designation should have a development effect that would decrease 
the value of the property.  In studying residential sales in Newton, Massachusetts from 
1988 through 2005, I find that the wetlands designation does decrease property values by 
4%.  This is similar in sign, if not in magnitude, to the result reported by Guttery et al in 
their study of multifamily units in Louisiana.   
However, this paper also controls for having neighboring properties that are 
designated as wetlands which is a simultaneous test of the amenity effect.  Only Netusil 
has done this by including proximity to wetlands as an explanatory variable, but her 
sample size was very small and was confounded by potential multicollinearity.   This 
study finds that having neighbors with wetlands designations does not impact property 
values, which suggests that the amenity effect is not present in the case of wetlands 
designation, at least in Newton.   
 These results present a puzzle.  Why have other researchers who control only for 
proximity to wetlands, not for the presence of wetlands on the property itself, generally 
found that the regulations increased value (which suggests an amenity effect exists)?   
There are several possibilities.  The first is that the types of wetlands found in Newton are 
not perceived as positive (or negative) externalities if they are on neighboring properties.  
Doss and Taff report that home owners in their study appear to have preferences over 
different types of wetlands which may hold true in Newton as well.   
A second possibility is that home buyers are unaware of the regulations on 
neighboring properties as the time of purchase.  Buyers may research regulations on their 
 20
own properties but not concern themselves with regulations on adjoining properties.  If 
owners are unaware of the characteristics being controlled for in the hedonic model, then 
we would expect the variable to be statistically insignificant.   
Whether these results are unique to Newton must be the subject of further 
research.  However, recall that this approach only examines the costs and benefits to 
homeowners.  Even if the owners do not experience benefits from having wetlands in 
their area, benefits to the larger society or to the ecosystem itself may justify the costs to 
those owners of regulated properties.   
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Figure 1: Newton Map 
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Figure 2:  Wetlands in Newton 
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Table 1:  Variable names, descriptions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Description Mean 
(std dev) 
All properties 
Mean 
(std dev) 
Wetlands properties 
Price Sales price of house 435,986.10 
(217,325.20) 
458,015.80 
(235,800.80) 
Age Age of house 67.01 
(31.39) 
52.598 
(35.615 
Bathrooms # of bathrooms 2.43 
(0.97) 
2.67 
(1.086 
Bedrooms # of bedrooms 3.69 
(1.088) 
3.71 
(1.23 
Lotsize Size of lot (in sq ft) 10,888.63 
6,439.05) 
15,599.49 
(12,536.31 
Capecod =1 if house is Cape 
Cod style 
0.148 
0.121) 
0.117 
(0.322) 
Colonial =1 if house is 
Colonial style 
0.44 
(0.496) 
0.375 
(0.485) 
Contemporary =1 if house is 
Contemporary style 
0.016 
(0.125) 
0.070 
(0.256) 
Cottage =1 if house is 
Cottage style 
0.015 
(0.121) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
Oldstyle =1 if house is Old 
style 
0.12 
(0.325) 
0.055 
(0.228) 
Ranchc =1 if house is Ranch 
style 
0.126 
(0.332) 
0.168 
(0.375) 
Splitlevel =1 if house is split 
level 
0.048 
(0.214) 
0.113 
(0.318) 
Tudor =1 if house is Tudor 
style 
0.05 
(0.217) 
0.012 
(0.108) 
Victorian =1 if house is 
Victorian style 
0.09 
(0.286) 
0.051 
(0.220) 
Wetland =1 if property has 
designated wetlands 
on it 
0.023 
(0.148) 
 
Rnwet # of residential 
neighboring 
properties with 
wetlands on them 
0.059 
(0.134) 
1.00 
(1.124) 
    
# observations  11,341 256 
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Figure 3:  Histogram of number of neighbors with wetlands 
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Table 2:  Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: LNPRICE   
Included observations: 11340   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.79945 0.027356 431.3310 0.0000 
AGE 0.001931 0.000381 5.068091 0.0000 
AGESQ -1.03E-05 2.09E-06 -4.937934 0.0000 
BATHROOMS 0.127039 0.004178 30.41010 0.0000 
BEDROOMS 0.036320 0.003528 10.29570 0.0000 
YR89 -0.026244 0.015046 -1.744233 0.0811 
YR90 -0.068030 0.015651 -4.346677 0.0000 
YR91 -0.114103 0.014753 -7.733985 0.0000 
YR92 -0.099082 0.014750 -6.717452 0.0000 
YR93 -0.064396 0.014900 -4.321914 0.0000 
YR94 -0.008476 0.014400 -0.588592 0.5561 
YR95 0.004257 0.015902 0.267693 0.7889 
YR96 0.084935 0.014688 5.782464 0.0000 
YR97 0.152063 0.015039 10.11149 0.0000 
YR98 0.271782 0.014215 19.11911 0.0000 
YR99 0.345521 0.014865 23.24387 0.0000 
YR00 0.520334 0.014607 35.62186 0.0000 
YR01 0.610748 0.015629 39.07833 0.0000 
YR02 0.649928 0.015720 41.34463 0.0000 
YR03 0.709779 0.015757 45.04480 0.0000 
YR04 0.824838 0.014071 58.62173 0.0000 
YR05 0.851618 0.020440 41.66376 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 1.63E-05 8.42E-07 19.34723 0.0000 
CAPECOD 0.154345 0.016334 9.449192 0.0000 
COLONIAL 0.278520 0.015529 17.93500 0.0000 
CONTEMPORARY 0.339083 0.039674 8.546805 0.0000 
OLDSTYLE 0.061973 0.016217 3.821524 0.0001 
RANCHC 0.148429 0.017156 8.651642 0.0000 
SPLITLEVEL 0.281078 0.019213 14.62936 0.0000 
TUDOR 0.456207 0.019366 23.55662 0.0000 
VICTORIAN 0.349348 0.019129 18.26268 0.0000 
NONANTUM -0.092188 0.012287 -7.503181 0.0000 
CENTRE -0.064818 0.009139 -7.092209 0.0000 
VILLE -0.117794 0.011089 -10.62306 0.0000 
HIGHLANDS -0.121275 0.010559 -11.48560 0.0000 
LOWERF -0.184592 0.014561 -12.67685 0.0000 
UPPERF -0.230334 0.016190 -14.22734 0.0000 
WEST -0.118688 0.010047 -11.81292 0.0000 
AUBURN -0.141012 0.011774 -11.97676 0.0000 
CHILL -0.012673 0.013503 -0.938483 0.3480 
WETLAND -0.034837 0.021043 -1.655520 0.0978 
     
     R-squared 0.698608     Mean dependent var 12.86917 
Adjusted R-squared 0.697541     S.D. dependent var 0.480995 
S.E. of regression 0.264529     Akaike info criterion 0.181880 
Sum squared resid 790.6563     Schwarz criterion 0.208404 
Log likelihood -990.2591     F-statistic 654.7600 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.348838     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table 3:  Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: LNPRICE   
Included observations: 11340   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.79932 0.027372 431.0713 0.0000 
AGE 0.001935 0.000381 5.074010 0.0000 
AGESQ -1.03E-05 2.09E-06 -4.942818 0.0000 
BATHROOMS 0.127117 0.004185 30.37446 0.0000 
BEDROOMS 0.036286 0.003529 10.28331 0.0000 
YR89 -0.026275 0.015046 -1.746264 0.0808 
YR90 -0.067932 0.015651 -4.340471 0.0000 
YR91 -0.114035 0.014755 -7.728691 0.0000 
YR92 -0.099046 0.014747 -6.716536 0.0000 
YR93 -0.064305 0.014896 -4.316921 0.0000 
YR94 -0.008479 0.014399 -0.588869 0.5560 
YR95 0.004432 0.015906 0.278640 0.7805 
YR96 0.084917 0.014687 5.781733 0.0000 
YR97 0.152174 0.015037 10.11986 0.0000 
YR98 0.271938 0.014215 19.13088 0.0000 
YR99 0.345438 0.014868 23.23379 0.0000 
YR00 0.520359 0.014607 35.62444 0.0000 
YR01 0.610886 0.015628 39.08833 0.0000 
YR02 0.649902 0.015716 41.35373 0.0000 
YR03 0.709799 0.015760 45.03764 0.0000 
YR04 0.824795 0.014070 58.62011 0.0000 
YR05 0.851655 0.020440 41.66561 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 1.63E-05 8.46E-07 19.23412 0.0000 
CAPECOD 0.154184 0.016365 9.421677 0.0000 
COLONIAL 0.278500 0.015561 17.89776 0.0000 
CONTEMPORARY 0.338739 0.039682 8.536263 0.0000 
OLDSTYLE 0.061818 0.016253 3.803529 0.0001 
RANCHC 0.147995 0.017181 8.613668 0.0000 
SPLITLEVEL 0.280635 0.019217 14.60329 0.0000 
TUDOR 0.456195 0.019390 23.52729 0.0000 
VICTORIAN 0.349453 0.019152 18.24619 0.0000 
NONANTUM -0.092190 0.012289 -7.501951 0.0000 
CENTRE -0.064865 0.009146 -7.091981 0.0000 
VILLE -0.117917 0.011100 -10.62349 0.0000 
HIGHLANDS -0.121578 0.010599 -11.47044 0.0000 
LOWERF -0.184364 0.014558 -12.66412 0.0000 
UPPERF -0.230385 0.016198 -14.22261 0.0000 
WEST -0.118597 0.010046 -11.80591 0.0000 
AUBURN -0.140992 0.011771 -11.97779 0.0000 
CHILL -0.012673 0.013503 -0.938542 0.3480 
 30
WETLAND -0.040697 0.022470 -1.811143 0.0701 
RNWET 0.006339 0.008867 0.714873 0.4747 
     
     R-squared 0.698621     Mean dependent var 12.86917 
Adjusted R-squared 0.697528     S.D. dependent var 0.480995 
S.E. of regression 0.264535     Akaike info criterion 0.182013 
Sum squared resid 790.6218     Schwarz criterion 0.209183 
Log likelihood -990.0112     F-statistic 638.7737 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.348924     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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